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SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT AS
APPLIED TO CONGLOMERATE
MERGERS: INCIPIENT ANTITRUST
DOCTRINE
LUTHER C. MCKINNEY*
The conglomerate merger' movement 2 has spawned much concern and
controversy that continues unabated. Critics of large, diversified corpora-
tions fear not only that conglomeration lessens competition in various
product lines, but also that it is responsible for the centralization of indus-
B.S., Iowa State University, 1953; LL.B., University of Illinois, 1959.
I A conglomerate merger is one that is neither horizontal (between actual competitors
in a relevant market) nor vertical (between firms in a supplier-customer relationship).
Conglomerate mergers can be further divided into the sub-categories of product extension,
geographic market extension and pure conglomerate. A product extension merger requires
that the acquired firm's product be closely related to one or more of the products of the
acquiring company. This relationship occurs when the products may be advertised, distrib-
uted or sold in the same fashion or through the same outlets or to the same customers.
Some writers have gone so far as to suggest every merger that permits any beneficial
integration of management, production and other facilities and marketing techniques is
of the product extension variety. See J. NARVER, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS AND MARKET
COMPETITION 67-69 (1967). Thus, the acquisition by a soap manufacturer of a producer
of bleaches is a product extension merger. A market extension merger requires that the
acquiring firm deal in the same product, but in a different geographic area. A pure
conglomerate merger does not involve any relationship between the products involved,
and does not give rise to any integration of management, facilities or marketing of
products. This type rarely occurred until the rise of the modem conglomerate corporation.
On definitions generally, see Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven:
The Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1232 (1968).
2 In recent years conglomerate mergers have accounted for the bulk of corporate
mergers and acquisitions. Federal Trade Commission statistics indicate that conglomerate
mergers in 1968 made up 89 percent of the total number of all acquisitions of manufac-
turing and mining firms with assets of $10 million or more. BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC,
CURRENT TRENDS IN MERGER ACTIVITY (1969). This figure represents a sharp increase in
the incidence of conglomerate mergers over past years. For example, in the period 1951-
1954 conglomerates accounted for merely 51 percent of all mergers and in 1963-1966, for
only 71 percent of corporate mergers. Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High, FORTUNE,
Feb. 1969, at 79.
Commission statistics also suggest that the incidence of mergers is generally significant
in terms of the assets acquired. In 1950, assets acquired in large mergers (acquired units
with assets of $10 million or more) amounted to only $173 million, and in 1963 the total
rose to $2,956 million. But in 1968, the assets acquired in large mergers totaled about
$12,800 million. BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS
1-15 (1969) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT]. However, it should be noted that the pur-
chasing power of the dollar has declined substantially since 1950. In equivalent dollars,
the figures would be 1950-$208 million; 1963-$2,749 million; and 1968-$10,496 million.
The purchasing power of the dollar figures are from STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.
1968, at 341.
The Commission's figures also indicate that the level of economic concentration has
increased. It reported that the share of manufacturing assets held by the hundred largest
corporations was larger in 1968 than the share of manufacturing assets held by the 200
largest corporations in 1950, the year Congress enacted the Celler-Kefauver amendment
to section 7. FTC REPORT at 3.
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trial resources into fewer and fewer hands. Such a development, it is urged,
could lead to fewer independent enterprises and decision-makers in the
economy, thus posing substantial dangers to American economic, political,
and social life. For example, the Attorney General of the United States has
stressed the undesirable consequences that can occur in many areas of the
country when businesses that were formerly locally-owned are acquired by a
large corporation with headquarters thousands of miles away.3 Also, some
critics have blamed unhealthy speculation in the securities markets on
,conglomerate firms. 4 Conversely, others urge that conglomerate corporations
promote competition and do not pose substantial dangers to the American
society or its political life. Thus, Harold S. Geneen, Chairman of the Board
of International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), arguing that far from
stifling competition, conglomerate corporations have increased competitive
behavior in the industries they entered through acquisitions,5 recently
warned that a policy denying access "to change, innovation and new indus-
trial competition by the route of diversifications of meaningful size will
result in a stagnant status quo of existing large companies within an
industry regardless of efficiency or competitiveness." 6
The debate concerning the applicability of section 7 of the Clayton Act 7
to conglomerate acquisitions has occurred at the highest levels of antitrust
enforcement. While the Antitrust Division previously was uncertain as to
the application of section 7 to conglomerate mergers, the Division now views
the situation quite differently. For instance, a spokesman for the Antitrust
Division recently suggested that the legislative history of the amended
section 7 of the Clayton Act and the spirit, if not the letter, of Supreme
Court merger decisions in recent years indicate that this statute should be
applied to stem the tide of aggregate concentration of assets.8 And from
January 1969 to date, the Department of Justice brought five cases aimed,
in whole or in part, at conglomerate acquisitions - including challenges to
ITT's acquisitions of Canteen Corporation, 9 Grinnell Corporation and
the Hartford Fire Insurance Company; 10 to Northwest Industries' attempted
takeover of B. F. Goodrich;" and to Ling-Temco-Vought's (LTV's) merger
3 Address by Att'y Gen. John Mitchell, Georgia Bar Association, Savannah, Georgia,
June 6, 1969, in 5 TR.ADE REG. REP. 50,247 (June 16, 1969).
4 See, e.g., Address by Assistant Att'y Gen. McLaren, in Hearings on Tax Reform Be-
fore the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
5 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 21, 1969, at 8, col. 2.
6 Id.
7 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
8 Address by Roland Donnem, Director of Policy Planning for the Antitrust Division,
Nov. 10, 1969, in 5 TRADE REG. RE-P. 50,263 (Nov. 24, 1969).
9 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 5 TRADE REG. REs. (1969 Trade
Cas.) 45,069, at 52,715 (N.D. Ill. April 28, 1969).
10 United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
11 United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Il1. 1969) (prelim-
inary injunction denied).
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with Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation.1 2 In response to this controversy,
this article will examine the application of section 7 to conglomerate
mergers.
SECTION 7: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Section 7, as amended, forbids any acquisition by a corporation of stock
or corporate assets "where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition . . . may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly."' 3 The antimerger provision of
the 1914 Act applied only to stock acquisitions and was so narrowly drafted
that, literally interpreted, it appeared to apply only to the merger of direct
competitors.' 4
In 1950, Congress undoubtedly intended to close the loophole that
exempted asset acquisitions from the coverage of the Act, and also, to
demonstrate that Congress' concern was not limited to mergers between
direct competitors. Although the legislative history is somewhat sparse in
regard to conglomerate mergers, the House Report supporting the new
section 7 stated: "[T]he bill applies to all types of mergers and acquisitions,
vertical and conglomerate as well as horizontal which have the specified
effects of substantially lessening competition . . . or tending to create a
monopoly."' 5 Concern about conglomerates among proponents of the
amendment was generally related to two issues. The first was the competi-
tive superiority of diversified firms over single market firms. For example,
Representative Hale Boggs, referring to conglomerate firms in the House
debate, stated:
This is the type which carries the activities of giant corporations into
all sorts of fields, often completely unrelated to their normal operations.
In times such as these, when big corporations have such huge quantities
of funds, they are constantly looking around for new kinds of businesses
to enter. By this process they build up huge business enterprises which
enable them to play one type of business against another in order to drive
out competitors1O
12 United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 5 TADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.)
45,069, at 52,712 (W.D. Pa. April 14, 1969). A proposed consent decree requiring LTV
to divest either Jones and Laughlin or Braniff Airways and Okonite, and limiting future
acquisitions has been filed but not entered. 1970 Trade Cas. 73,105 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10,
1970).
13 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
14 Before its amendment in 1950, the Act read:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation
engaged also in commerce where the effect of such acquisition may be to sub-
stantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any
section or community, or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce....
Clayton Act § 7, ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914).
15 H.R. REP. No. 1191i 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1949).
1695 CONG. Rac. 11,496 (1949).
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Thus, Congress clearly intended conglomerates to be included within the
scope of the amended section 7. And, as commentators have pointed out,
the appropriate congressional committees did not even demand rigorous
analysis of the economic effects a conglomerate can produce in the market-
place.17
Secondly, as the Supreme Court has pointed out, Congress expressed
concern over economic concentration itself. In its Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States's opinion the Court stated that "[t]he dominant theme pervading
Congressional consideration of the 1950 amendment was a fear of what was
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American
economy."' 9 Proponents of the amendment spoke at length about the
dangers such concentration posed to the country. For example, Congressman
Celler asked the following question:
How far should government, the people, allow that kind of concentration
... we call conglomerate concentration to proceed? ... [I]f no brakes are
placed on it, we are going to have, are we not, a few dominating com-
panies like General Motors, which in effect is a holding company, purely
an investment holding company ... ? You get to the point where it is
so large that it affects the lives and happiness of so many people, that as
a matter of fact, you could not let it fail.20
The Senate Report on the bill stated:
[N]ot only must we consider the probable effects of the merger upon the
economics of the particular markets affected but also we must consider its
probable effects upon the economic way of life sought to be preserved by
Congress. Congress was desirous of preventing the formation of further
oligopolies with their attendant adverse effects upon local control of indus-
try and upon small business. Where an industry was composed of numerous
independent units, Congress appeared anxious to preserve this structure.21
Nonetheless, the legislative history does not dearly indicate that
Congress intended to proscribe mergers that would result solely in increasing
economic concentration. As Donald Turner has pointed out, the House
and Senate committee reports, which contained explicit exceptions for
acquisitions of failing companies, and for small company mergers that will
lead to greater competition with large firms, generally indicate that the
amended statute was directed only at mergers that would lead to a reason-
able probability of anticompetitive effects.22 It should also be noted that
the statute which Congress finally enacted appears to apply only to mergers
17 See, e.g., J. NARVER, supra note 1, at 47-48.
18 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
191d. at 315.
20 Hearings on S.14 Before the Subcomm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 14, pt. 1, at 636 (1949).
21 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
22 Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 I-Iv. L. REV.
1313, 1316 (1965). See also S. REp. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 6, 7 (1950); H.R. REP.
No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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that have demonstrable anticompetitive effects in a specific relevant market,
and the courts have consistently construed section 7 in this fashion.
SECTION 7: THE CASES
Government agencies have adopted four basic approaches in challeng-
ing conglomerate acquisitions under section 7.23 The first three theories,
which have been accepted by the courts in the proper circumstances, in-
clude: (1) a lessening of potential competition; (2) the "deep pocket" or
subsidization theory; and (3) increased opportunity for reciprocity or
reciprocity effect. All three involve the traditional determination in merger
cases that it must be probable that competition will be lessened in a relevant
market. In the fourth approach, which has not yet been embraced by any
court, the Government argues that the mere aggregate concentration of
assets leads to a probable lessening of competition, thereby falling within
the ambit of section 7.
Potential Competition
The doctrine that a merger may violate section 7 by eliminating poten-
tial rather than actual competition between the merging companies has
played an important role in the law relating to conglomerate mergers, and
is particularly effective when employed against a product or market exten-
sion merger. Thus, when two firms deal in similar products, or in the same
products in different, possibly contiguous, market areas, the theory has much
force which can be demonstrated in court. However, the doctrine does have
severe limitations, and it is doubtful, for reasons discussed below, that it can
(or should) have much application to a pure conglomerate acquisition.
Adverse effects on competition by the acquisition of a potential com-
petitor may come about in several different ways. For example, the merger
may diminish potential competition by raising barriers to entry, or it may
remove as an independent competitive force a firm that, although not
selling in the market of the acquired firm, has had an impact on the be-
havior of companies in that market because it was recognized as a likely
entrant. And finally, the merger may involve a firm that would have entered
the acquired firm's market by internal expansion or by acquiring a smaller
company (foothold acquisition) if the merger had not occurred. 24
The first of the modern potential competition cases was United States v.
El Paso Natural Gas Co.2 5 El Paso, the only out-of-state supplier of natural
gas to California (with over 50 percent of sales), acquired Pacific Northwest,
which was operating in a contiguous market and had on previous occasions
attempted to enter El Paso's California market. The Supreme Court, holding
23 Mergers which are primarily conglomerate in nature may have horizontal or vertical
aspects which are themselves sufficient to bring the acquisition within section 7. See, e.g.,
United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
24 Turner, supra note 22, at 1362.
25 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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that the merger was violative of section 7, stressed the salutary effect that
Pacific had on competition by remaining, capable of entry, on the edge of
the California market. In fact, evidence in the record demonstrated that
El Paso did provide better service and lower prices to an account after
Pacific had made overtures for the business.26
But proof that the acquired company has attempted to enter or will
enter the relevant market is not essential to invoke the doctrine of potential
competition. The courts will look to objective factors indicating that a
particular firm is a potential entrant, even if "subjective" evidence that the
company intends to enter does not exist. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem-
ical Co.2 7 clearly sets forth this principle. Olin Mathieson and Pennsalt
formed a joint venture to build and operate a sodium chlorate producing
plant in the southeastern United States. The market structure was highly
oligopolistic, with two corporations holding a virtual monopoly share (90
percent) of the market; and no company had entered the market for ten
years prior to the entry of the defendant companies. Eschewing the fact that
no evidence existed that either company intended to enter individually, the
Supreme Court remanded for a determination that one of the corporations
would have entered alone, while the other remained a potential competitor.
The Court looked to several objective factors. The market itself was an
oligopoly, yet the industry was expanding rapidly. Both parent corporations
possessed the inclination, resources and know-how to enter the market, while
few other corporations possessed the same. Also, each company had im-
portant reasons for entering the southeast market.28 In view of these circum-
stances, the Court concluded that there was a prima facie probability that
one of the firms would enter alone, and explicitly stated that subjective
evidence was not required.
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,29 the third recent Supreme Court deci-
sion on potential competition, adds little to the rules set forth in El Paso
and Penn-Olin, although it does suggest that the Court remains receptive
to "objective" rather than "subjective" tests of likely potential entrants.
Procter, the nation's largest seller and advertiser of household cleansing
products, acquired Clorox, a firm accounting for almost 50 percent of sales
in the extremely concentrated household liquid bleach market. The FTC
26 Id. at 659. El Paso can also be analyzed as a case where actual horizontal competition
was present, since Pacific Northwest did compete for contracts with El Paso, although it
did not obtain any. Nevertheless, the case was analyzed in terms of potential competition,
generally is characterized as such, and is the seminal case for an analysis of this doctrine.
27 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
28 Id. at 173. On remand, the district court dismissed for the second time. It found
that neither Pennsalt nor Olin-Mathieson probably would have entered independently
since neither company's board of directors had shown much interest in entering alone, and
since projected profitability did not meet managements' standards for diversification.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965). Although the
Government again appealed, the dismissal was affirmed by an equally-divided Court.
389 US. 308 (1967).
29 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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found that Procter was the most likely potential entrant into the liquid
bleach industry because of its marketing strength, the close relationship of
its household products to the bleach sold by Clorox, and its previous history
of strong independent entry into related product areas. The Supreme Court
affirmed this view over the court of appeals' reversal of the Commission,
stating:
Procter was engaged in a vigorous program of diversifying into product
lines closely related to its basic products. Liquid bleach was a natural
avenue of diversification since it is complementary to Procter's products,
is sold to the same customers through the same channels, and is advertised
and merchandised in the same manner. 0
Hence, the decisions of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrate that
when an oligopolistic market structure exists, and the acquiring firm is the
most likely entrant, as evidenced by ability, product affinity and past history,
the potential competition theory can be utilized to block the acquisition of
a significant factor in the market. Stated thusly, the limitations of the
doctrine are easily discerned. The market involved must be an oligopoly.
If vigorous competition actually exists among a significant number of firms
in the relevant market, it can be argued that a potential competitor would
have little additional impact on the quality of competition and, indeed, is
not needed. Also, there must be some degree of product affinity between
the merging firms. If not, there is no objective reason for deciding that one
particular large company is any more of a potential entrant than another;
thus the theory would have little application to a pure conglomerate acqui-
sition. An additional limitation is that the objective factors discussed above
must show that the acquiring firm would have been a likely entrant by
internal expansion. And finally, the acquired firm must be a significant
factor in its market. Indeed, if a large firm purchased a very small com-
petitor, this "foothold acquisition" might well stimulate rather than stifle
competition.
One district court, however, on a hearing for a preliminary injunction,
has taken the potential competition doctrine one step further in United
States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co.8 ' Wilson, the largest seller of sporting
goods and a subsidiary of LTV acquired Nissen, the country's leading
producer of gymnastic equipment. Although it found that the objective
factors set forth in the El Paso case did not indicate that Wilson would
enter by internal expansion, the court held that the elimination by this
merger of one of the most likely potential entrants might lessen competition
since "it could easily be the trigger to a round of mergers that would trans-
form the nature of the industry."8 2 Even though other large firms would
remain on the fringe as potential entrants, it would be less likely that any
so ld. at 580.
31288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
32 Id. at 562.
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of them would consider entering by internal expansion because entry
barriers would be raised, and the remaining competitors themselves would
encourage mergers with the large firms. The court continued, stating:
Loss through merger of one of a recognized small group of significant
potential entrants, lessens the likelihood of future deconcentration for it
removes a company which could have been expected to furnish significant
competition to the leading firms in the industry had it entered.83
The district court did say that it would not preliminarily enjoin the merger
solely for this reason; rather, it would consider this anticompetitive effect
along with the others involved.
Essentially, the Wilson court extended the doctrine in two particulars.
First, it broadened the class of potential competitors to include any one of
several companies capable of entry into a market without a showing that
the firm was the most likely entrant. It thus extended the decisions in
El Paso and Procter & Gamble, where, in each instance, the Supreme Court
found that the acquiring firm was the most likely entrant, as well as the
Penn-Olin decision, where the Court found that one firm conceivably could
enter alone while the other remained a potential competitor. Secondly, the
view that potential competition would be lessened because other firms will
be more reluctant to enter internally and would be likely to merge with
other leaders in the acquired firm's industry represents a broader approach.
Instead of regarding only the acquiring company as the potential competi-
tion eliminated by the merger, the court looked to other potential entrants
whose future behavior probably would be affected by the combination.
The recent decision of the Third Circuit in Allis-Chalmers Manufac-
turing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc.,3 4 which resulted from
White's tender offer for Allis-Chalmers stock, appears to adopt the view
that a merger with any one of a number of eligible entrants lessens potential
competition. As one of its reasons for reversing the district court's denial
of a preliminary injunction, the court found that Allis-Chalmers was "a
potential entrant" into the steel rolling mill industry in which White's
Blaw-Knox subsidiary was a leading manufacturer, and that its elimination
was sufficient to invoke section 7.35 The adoption of this approach, of course,
expands the reach of section 7 considerably.
Transferral of Market Power: The Deep Pocket Theory
The "deep pocket" or rich parent theory strikes directly at the substance
of what critics of the conglomerate merger movement find most troublesome:
the fear that competition will be impaired by large, diversified firms capable
of dominating various product lines. The House Report which accompanied
the Celler-Kefauver Act suggested that mergers might hinder competition
83 Id.
34 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, - US. - (1970).
Sld. at 533-34.
INCIPIENT ANTITRUST DOCTRINE
not only by eliminating a direct competitor or foreclosing a market, but also
by creating an "increase in the relative size of the enterprise making the
acquisition to such a point that its advantage over its competitors threatens
to be decisive."8 6 Similarly, Robert A. Bicks, former Assistant Attorney
General in charge of antitrust, has written that, "if we gauge the legality of
'conglomerates' under Section 7 . . . most in point is the 'advantage that
threatens to be decisive' test."3 7
Several courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, have
considered this theory and have used it to invalidate conglomerate mergers
in certain market situations. Although these cases involved disparate circum-
stances, each contained certain common factors. Generally, a large and
powerful company acquired a leading firm in an oligopolistic market and
the court found that the stronger company could transfer its financial power
either directly or indirectly to its new line, thereby augmenting or en-
trenching the market position of the acquired company. In the invalidated
mergers, the courts found that the financial power could be used either to
help the smaller firm gain marketing or promotional advantages or to en-
gage in predatory pricing.
In the extremely important case of FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,38
this leading soap manufacturer, with assets of over $500 million and sales
of $1.1 billion, acquired Clorox, the largest producer of liquid bleach with
sales of $40 million. The Supreme Court found that the liquid bleach
market consisted of a number of small producers in a tight-knit oligopoly.
The Court also noted that Procter relied heavily on advertising to promote
its products, that it advertised heavily enough to receive quantity discounts,
and that advertising was extremely important in the sale of bleach, since
all liquid bleaches were chemically identical. The Court found that the
combination of huge resources with these quantity discounts could "sub-
stantially reduce the competitive structure of the industry by raising entry
barriers and by dissuading the smaller firms from aggressively competing."8 9
36 H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
87 Bicks, Corporate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws: Clayton Act, Section 7, in THE
CORPOp.ATE MERGER 71, 85 (W. Alberts & J. Segall eds. 1966).
38 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
39 Id. at 578. In General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 919 (1968), a case extremely similar to Procter, the court of appeals applied the
subsidization doctrine. General Foods, a large manufacturer of household name brands,
acquired SOS, one of the two largest makers of steel wool pads. (The two largest, SOS and
Brillo, had a combined market share of 90 percent.) After the merger SOS launched a
promotional campaign that increased its market share from about 45 percent to 60 percent.
In addition to subsidization of advertising, the FTC found that General Foods aided
SOS by offering discounts on pooled purchases of SOS and other General Foods products
and by securing favorable shelf space arrangements. This case previews United States
v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968), which will be discussed
below. Cf. Butler Aviation v. CAB, 389 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1968), where the Second Circuit
rejected the argument that the acquisition of Remmert-Werner by Eastern Airlines came
within the rationale of Procter. The court found that advertising was not a substantial
factor in the marketing of executive business jets. Also, the court pointed out that the
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Thus, Procter would assume the role of price leader and the oligopoly would
become more rigid.
A second type of resource shifting that has invalidated a merger is
subsidization of predatory pricing. In Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC,40 in an
opinion written by Chief Justice Burger while he was a member of the
District of Columbia Circuit, the court of appeals sustained the Commis-
sion's decision that Reynolds, the world's largest maker of aluminum,
violated section 7 by its product extension acquisition of Arrow. The
acquired company was a leading firm (33 percent of the market) in an
industry comprised of companies that were dwarfed by Reynolds. Since
the amount of foreclosure was insignificant, the court disregarded any
possible vertical overtones of the merger, and focused instead on the con-
glomerate issue, stating:
The power of the "deep pocket" or "rich parent" for one of the florist
foil suppliers in a competitive group where previously no company was
very large and all were relatively small opened the possibility and power
to sell at prices approximating cost or below and thus to undercut and
ravage the less affluent competition. 41
The court did not demand that the Commission prove that such conduct
had actually taken place; rather it need only establish that the acquisition
had the capacity or potentiality to lessen competition. In Reynolds, however,
an anticompetitive effect was shown, since Arrow's market share increased
at the expense of its competitors after the merger took place.
42
There has been much criticism of the view that a merger violates sec.
tion 7 because it creates the potential for predatory pricing.43 There is little
indication that this is a common practice since there are few instances of
such conduct on record. Additionally, such a strategy involves a great deal
of risk. To make it worthwhile, the user must be able to recoup his losses
through monopoly profits at a later time, and there is no certainty he will
succeed. Furthermore, since predatory pricing is violative of section 1 of the
Sherman Act 44 and section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act,45 the enforcement
"advertising and marketing of Eastern Airline's transportation services do not have the
ready blend with fixed base operations that existed between Procter & Gamble's detergents
and Clorox's liquid bleach." Id. at 519-20.
40 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
41 Id. at 229, 230.
42 For another example of a type of subsidization, see Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 547
F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1963). In this case, Ekco, a large manufacturer of household kitchen
equipment, acquired McClintock, a small firm that accounted for 85 percent of the market
of commercial meat handling equipment. After the merger, McClintock acquired one of
its competitors, thereby increasing its market share to 90 percent. The Seventh Circuit
upheld the Commission's finding that without Ekco's resources McClintock would have
been unable to purchase Blackman, its competitor. The court stated: "This shows to
our satisfaction the reasonable probability that Ekco's purchase of McClintock may serve
to entrench and preserve McClintock's monopoly." Id. at 752.
43 For an extended criticism of this view, see Turner, supra note 22, at 1343-51;
Note, Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1265 (1963).
44 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
45 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
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agencies can utilize these statutes to deal with such conduct when it arises.
In addition, predatory pricing in violation of the Sherman Act can subject
the user to treble damage liability.4 6
The final form of subsidization arises not from a shifting of financial
resources, but from the nature and facilities of the larger company. The
question was presented in the government's suit for a preliminary injunction
to block Wilson Sporting Goods' acquisition of Nissen, the leading maker
of gymnastic equipment in an industry composed of small firms.4 7 The court
found that advertising and promotion did not play a significant role in
Nissen's marketing of its goods since the company spent only a small amount
for these purposes each year and had ample resources to increase the amount
if it so desired. However, the court did find that placing Wilson, a large
firm, in the midst of small companies would have a detrimental effect on
competition because Nissen would have a substantial advantage over its
competitors at the dealer level. Both companies sold through dealers, but
Wilson utilized more than 10,000, including 90 percent of the sporting
goods dealers in the country. The court reasoned that Wilson's dealers
would have a strong incentive to handle Nissen's products, even if Wilson
did not compel them to do so, and that given the advantages Wilson can
offer a dealer with regard to service, credit and billing, such incentive might
come from the dealer himself.
The Third Circuit adopted a similar approach in United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co.48 The court voided the merger, in part, because as a
consequence of the acquisitions, Ingersoll-Rand would be able to market a
full line of mining equipment to the detriment of the other small companies
in that industry. And in the recent decision in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing
Co. v. White Consolidated Industries,49 part of the court's basis for issuing
a preliminary injunction was that the merger would permit Blaw-Knox, a
White subsidiary, to become the only company capable of designing, pro-
ducing and installing a complete metal rolling mill. Such a result was re-
garded as beng injurious to competition.
The district court in United States v. International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp.5o also recognized the validity of this doctrine, although
the court did not find that sufficient evidence had been presented to make a
determination that Grinnell was the dominant company in its market, that
a system of package selling of Grinnell's sprinklers with ITT's heating, air
conditioning and industrial control products was feasible, or that the system
46 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
47 United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 563-65 (N.D. I1. 1968).
48 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). Economists have criticized this decision on the grounds
that here "illegality attaches when the merger enables better service to consumers." Bork
& Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 363, 374 (1965). Cf. Elman, Clorox
and Conglomerate Mergers, 36 A.B.A. ANTrTRUST LJ. 23, 26-27 11967).
49 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969).
50 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
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would give Grinnell a competitive advantage over its competitors. Nonethe-
less, the court did recognize that if a competitive advantage could be shown
in such a factual setting, it might be grounds for invalidating the merger.51
These cases are significant because they deal with a type of subsidization
that does not focus solely on the wealth of the acquiring company, but
rather, on the nature of the acquiring company or of the merged entity.
This doctrine may well be used by the enforcement agencies to challenge
conglomerate mergers between extremely large companies, such as White
and Allis-Chalmers; in such instances the typical "rich parent" doctrine
would have little applicability since both firms are extremely large before
the merger and the mere addition of wealth would be of little consequence.
Reciprocity and Reciprocity Effect
The doctrine of reciprocity has also been used to invalidate a con-
glomerate merger under section 7. In the seminal case, FTC v. Consolidated
Foods, Corp.52 the Supreme Court upheld the Commission's finding that the
acquisition of Gentry, a producer of dehydrated onion and garlic, by Con-
solidated Foods, which owned a network of wholesale and retail food stores
as a part of its other operations, violated section 7. Consolidated was a
substantial purchaser of the products of food processors who, in turn,
bought dehydrated onion and garlic for use in preparing and packaging
their food. Thus, the opportunity to practice reciprocity was enhanced by
the merger. 53 The Court declared unequivocally that "'reciprocity' made
possible by such an acquisition is one of the congeries of anticompetitive
practices at which the antitrust laws are aimed."54
The Court then directed its attention to establishing the probability
that reciprocity would be increased by the merger. It found that Consoli-
dated did undertake to assist Gentry in selling after the acquisition (al-
though Consolidated later disclaimed adherence to any policy of reciprocity).
Disregarding the court of appeal's decision, based on post-acquisition evi-
dence, that reciprocity was not probable, the Supreme Court stated that
while the lower court was not in error in considering post-acquisition
evidence, it had given it too much weight. The majority opinion stressed
that no group acquiring the company with reciprocal buying opportunities
is entitled to a "free trial" period. Moreover, the Court found that the
post-acquisition evidence in this case tended to confirm the probable anti-
51 Id. at 778.
52 380 U.S. 592 (1965). In this case the Supreme Court defined reciprocity as "a
threatened withdrawal of orders if products of an affiliate cease being bought, as well as
conditioning of future purchases on the receipt of orders for products of that affiliate."
Id. at 594.
53 Id. at 598.
54 Id. at 600. For another case in which the merger was held to violate section 7 on
the basis of reciprocity, and where there was substantial evidence both that reciprocity was
practiced after the merger and that the practice led, to an increased market share, see
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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competitive effect which the Commission attributed to the merger. Basic's
product was superior to Gentry's; yet in a rapidly expanding market, Gentry
was able to increase its share of the onion sales by 7 percent and to hold its
losses in garlic to a 12 percent decrease. The Court then said that the finding
of probability of reciprocal buying by the Commission, "whose expertise
Congress trusts,"55 should be honored if there is substantial evidence to
support it. The evidence here was substantial, because "reciprocity was tried
over and over again and it sometimes worked."56 Also, the Court described
the industry structure as "peculiar," with Basic being the leader and Con-
solidated closing the gap. By "peculiar" the Court apparently meant pecu-
liarly susceptible to reciprocity.57
The Consolidated Foods case did not resolve a question that has an
important bearing on the efficacy of the reciprocity doctrine to challenge
conglomerate acquisitions, i.e., what evidence need be shown to demonstrate
a probability that reciprocity will be increased by the merger. Although the
majority was not called upon to resolve this question since Consolidated
dearly had a reciprocity program, the opinion does point out that "[r]ecipro-
cal trading may ensue not from bludgeoning or coercion but from more
subtle arrangements." 5 8 And Mr. Justice Stewart, who did address himself
to the question, stated:
Clearly the opportunity for reciprocity is not alone enough to invalidate
a merger under Section 7. The Clayton Act was not passed to outlaw
diversification. 9
In several recent complaints the Justice Department has advanced the
theory of "reciprocity effect." This theory, which is defined as "the tendency
of a firm desiring to sell to another company to channel its purchase to that
company," 6° does not depend on a probability that the merged entity will
practice reciprocal dealing. Rather, it suggests that by virtue of the creation
of a proper market structure, a firm will unilaterally direct its purchases to
potential customers. For instance, potential customers of the acquired firm
who desire to become suppliers of the' acquiring firm will consciously
channel their purchases toward the acquired firm in an attempt to induce
business in return. Since it is assumed that firms will act in the above de-
scribed manner when the possibility is presented, the creation of a conclusive
market structure satisfies this theory.
The lower courts have rendered inconsistent decisions with respect to
the evidence required to find that reciprocity or reciprocity effect rendered
a merger violative of section 7. Two cases have supported the view that once
a market structure favorable to such practices has been created, the statute
55 380 U.S. 600.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 380 U.S. at 594.
159 Id. at 603 (concurring opinion).
0United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1088 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
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has been violated. In United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co.,61 the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court's issuance of an interlocutory injunction restrain-
ing that company's acquisition of three manufacturers of mining equipment.
When the defendant asserted that there was no proof that it would take
advantage of the opportunity for reciprocity, the court's answer was un-
equivocal:
It is not overly speculative to assume that the judicious use of its steel-
purchasing power by Ingersoll-Rand could immeasurably increase the
sales by the acquired companies of machinery and equipment to the coal
mining companies which acutely need the continued good will of the
steel industry.6 2
And directly to the point of the reciprocity effect theory, the court said:
Moreover, the mere existence of this purchasing power might make its
conscious employment toward this end unnecessary; the possession of the
power is frequently sufficient, as sophisticated business men are quick to
see the advantages in securing the good will of the possessor.63
The recently decided White-Allis-Chalmers case also offers support for
the theory that the creation of a market structure conducive to reciprocity
is sufficient to invalidate a merger under section 7. The Third Circuit ex-
plicitly stated:
An acquisition which creates a market structure conducive to reciprocal
dealing presents the acquiring company with an advantage over compe-
titors, an advantage which by its very nature is anticompetitive.6 4
To support its position the court pointed out that the tremendous purchas-
ing power of a White-Allis combine, coupled with White's subsidiary's (Blaw-
Knox's) enhanced position in the rolling mill market, would foreclose
White's competitors in the sale of rolling mill machinery to the steel
industry.
On the other hand, the district court in United States v. Penick &
Ford, Ltd.65 refused to preliminarily enjoin Reynold's acquisition of the
fourth largest seller of starch on the theory of probability of reciprocal
dealing, even though it was shown that reciprocity had been practiced in
the starch industry for several years. The Government argued that since
Reynolds was a major buyer of paper and Penick & Ford sold starch to
paper companies, the merger created the opportunity of reciprocal dealing.
In ruling against the preliminary injunction motion the district court
reasoned that the Consolidated Foods result was dependent upon the
existence of high market concentration in the dehydrated garlic and onion
613 20 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
62 Id. at 520.
63 Id.
64 414 F.2d at 518.
65 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965). In a later consent decree Reynolds agreed to divest
itself of all its interest in Penick & Ford. United States v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
5 TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) 72,886 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 1969).
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industry. The starch business was rather evenly divided between 10 or 11
competitors; Penick & Ford had only 12 percent of the market in comparison
with Gentry's 35-50 percent. In addition, the court noted that Reynolds
had submitted affidavits attesting that it espoused a firm policy against
reciprocal dealing and instructed its purchasing agents to base their choice
on price, quality and service, and nothing else. 66 Given these facts, the court
did not see how it could be concluded prior to a full trial that reciprocal
dealing was probable. It should be noted, however, that this case still leaves
open the possibility that if the market were oligopolistic, an express policy
against reciprocity would not be sufficient to overcome the inference that
the practice probably would occur.
The district court directly confronted the question of opportunity for
reciprocity and reciprocity effect in United States v. ITT.67 The court
squarely rejected the government's argument that, as a matter of law, once
it has shown a merger will create an opportunity for reciprocity dealing,
that is sufficient to halt the merger. The court distinguished both Con-
solidated Foods and General Dynamics, since in those cases there was
evidence that a reciprocity program was actually practiced by the defendant
companies.6 8 The court also found differences between Ingersoll-Rand and
Allis-Chalmers, and the ITT situation. While reading these cases to hold
that the opportunity for reciprocity was sufficient to violate section 7, the
court distinguished them on the ground that the defendant companies
involved therein, unlike ITT, did not have an explicit company policy
against reciprocity. In support for this position the district court cited
Penick & Ford and United States v. Northwest Industries.69 In both of these
cases the court refused to issue a preliminary injunction on the theory of
reciprocity, because of evidence submitted by the defendants that they had
a company policy against this practice. The court also felt that ITT's posi-
tion was even stronger than Penick & Ford's or Northwest Industries', since
the Government did not establish the existence of an organized reciprocity
program or a prior history of reciprocal dealing by defendants or their
suppliers.70
As with the preceding theories, reciprocity and reciprocity effect have
significant limitations as methods of challenging conglomerate mergers.
There is no guaranty that the merger will substantially increase oppor-
tunities for reciprocity; and even if it does, proof of probability may be
difficult in many cases.
Economic Concentration Theory
In recent cases attacking conglomerate acquisitions, the Justice Depart-
ment has advanced the theory that a merger is forbidden by section 7 if it
66 242 F. Supp. at 525.
67 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969).
68 Id. at 784.
69 Id. at 785.
old. at 785-86.
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results in a substantial increase in economic concentration.7 This term
includes not only concentration in specific markets, which has been attacked
successfully in the past, but also aggregate concentration, involving the
size of business firms and the proportion of the economic activity of the
nation as a whole which they represent, or a broad classification of that
activity, such as manufacturing.
Mr. Roland Donnem, Director of Policy Planning for the Antitrust
Division, recently outlined the government's theory in some detail72 Pre-
liminarily, he argued that the statutory language "in any line of tommerce
in any section of the country" can be construed to mean the economy and
nation as a whole. They seem to be the relevant measurements if the subject
of concern is the size of business firms and the resulting aggregate concen-
tration in the economy.73 Furthermore, it can be urged that the word
"competition" in section 7 encompasses more than competition in the
economist's sense of business rivalry or performance. Mr. Donnem urged
that Congress intended the word competition to include "characteristics of
the competitive framework such as the size of firms and the contribution
they add to concentration in the economy."7 4 Mr. Donnem further argued
that cases such as Brown Shoe and United States v. Von's Grocery Co.75
indicate that as evidence concerning qualitative evil to our economic life
increases, the need to show other anticompetitive elements decreases. Thus,
where a qualitative harm to the country's economic life, such as the erosion
of local control of business and the concentration of economic power into a
few hands, can be demonstrated, there is no need to demonstrate specific
anticompetitive effects in particular markets.
In its recent cases, the Department has also urged that conglomerate
mergers result in demonstrable, probable anticompetitive effects in many
of their individual product lines. For instance, many companies are elim-
inated as independent decision-makers, thereby leading to a lessening of
competition in several markets.
The Government has argued that with the increasing number of busi-
ness relationships due to diversification, firms seem to develop a network
of harmonious interests that also may tend to decrease competition in the
various relevant markets in which they operate.76 For example, a firm which
71 See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra.
72 Address by Roland W. Donnem, supra note 8.
73 Id. at 55,578-79.
74 Id. at 55,579. It is by no means dear that the legislative history can be read in
this fashion. See United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 658, 660 (1964).
75 384 U.S. 270 (1966). In this case the Supreme Court held that a horizontal merger
between grocery chains violated section 7, although the merged entity controlled only
7.5 percent of the market and the merger increased the market share of the two largest
firms only 1.1 percent. The Court found a trend toward concentration in the relevant
market and reasoned that even a slight increase in concentration had a probability of
lessening competition.
76 See, e.g., United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1089 (NJ). Ill.
1969).
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is the price leader in market A may be reluctant to compete vigorously in
market B, where it is a less substantial factor, against a diversified firm that
it meets in both markets; its competitor may also be its customer or supplier
in other markets which may further interdependence among firms.
Moreover, Mr. Donnem noted that in certain horizontal merger cases,
where a trend toward concentration is shown, elaborate proof of competitive
harm is not required. This principle, he urged, can be carried over to aggre-
gate concentration to prevent conglomerate mergers. He pointed to the
Supreme Court's statement in United States v. Continental Can Co.77 to
support this view. The Court said:
Where a merger is of such a size as to be inherently suspect, elaborate
proof of market structure, market behavior and probable anticompetitive
effects may be dispensed within view of § 7's design to prevent undue
concentration.7 8
Finally, Mr. Donnem pointed out that the courts have an obligation to halt
anticompetitive effects in their incipiency, rather than waiting until after
competition has been harmed.
No court has yet handed down a final decision on the economic con-
centration theory, but the question has been considered by two district
courts on hearings for preliminary injunctions. In both cases the govern-
ment's argument was explicitly rejected. In the Justice Department's attack
of Northwest Industries' attempted takeover of B. F. Goodrich, the court
admitted that there may indeed be good reasons to limit growth by merger
of the country's largest industrial corporations:
The desirability of preserving the maximum number of competing units
in any given line of commerce so long as they can compete effectively,
the desirability of keeping entry barriers as low as possible, the increased
potential for anticompetitive practices which may result from bigness, all
are factors which may warrant a prohibition based on size alone.79
But the court then said:
The law as it now stands, however, makes the adverse effect on competi-
tion the test of validity and until Congress broadens the criteria, the
Court must judge proposed transactions on that standard.8 0
Likewise, in the ITT case, the court noted that the legislative history
of section 7 does reflect congressional concern about the rising tide of
economic concentration in American industry. But the court also pointed
out that "amended Section 7, as enacted proscribes only those mergers the
effect of which 'may be substantially to lessen competition,' not those the
77 378 US. 441 (1964).
78 Id. at 458; See also United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 821. (1964).
79 301 F. Supp. at 1096.
8Old.
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effect of which may be substantially to increase economic concentration."81
The court noted that a trend toward concentration in a particular product
line is important in determining if a merger diminishes competition in that
line. However, a merger which increases economic concentration does not
necessarily indicate a lessening of competition. Finally, the court agreed
with the Northwest court that the decision to change the standard determin-
ing a merger's illegality under section 7 to include an increase in economic
concentration should be left Congress.82
ADMINISTRATIVE REACTION TO CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
Since the advent of the Nixon Administration, the Department of
Justice has taken the view that section 7 does apply to the purer forms of
conglomerate mergers. As indicated above, the Department has challenged
five conglomerate acquisitions, and in each instance, has based its attack, in
part, on the theory that an increase in economic concentration violates
section 7. In addition to dangers to competition, the Department has ex-
pressed increasing concern over the broad economic, political and social
changes that it feels can be wrought by the conglomerate merger trend.
For example, the Attorney General has spoken at length of the danger that
America's smaller cities may become "branch cities" due to conglomerate
acquisition of local business and subsequent relocation of their headquarters
to distant, large metropolitan areas.83 He has also expressed concern that if
the current trend to concentration continues to increase, direct regulation of
business by government will result, thereby altering America's traditional
dependence upon the largely self-regulating economy which has served the
country well over the years.8 4 In response to these possible dangers, the Ad-
ministration has given notice (by words as well as action) that it intends to
go beyond the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines (Guidelines) in
challenging conglomerate acquisitions. The present Guidelines, issued on
May 30, 1968 under Donald Turner, generally do not venture very far from
the developing case law in delimiting which conglomerate mergers will be
challenged. They are restricted to the theories of potential competition,
reciprocity, and entrenchment (the deep-pocket or subsidization theory),
which demand that probable anticompetitive effects be demonstrated in a
relevant market.8 5 The Guidelines do contain the open-ended caveat that
since the conglomerate merger area involves novel problems not yet sub-
jected to as extensive or sustained analysis as vertical or horizontal mergers,
mergers not covered by the explicit prohibitions may be challenged 86
81 United States v. International Tel. & Tel., Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766, 796 (D. Conn.
1969).
82 Id. at 796-97.
83 See supra note 3, at 55,506.
84 Id. at 55,506-07.
85 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUMELINES, A.B.A. ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-
1968, at 311 (1968).
S Id. at 312.
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The Attorney General, on the other hand, has announced that there
is a "probability" that the Justice Department will challenge mergers that
would not violate section 7 under established case law. He has stated that
the Department "may well oppose" any merger among the top 200 manu-
facturing firms or firms of comparable size in other industries. In addition,
he has warned that the Department "will probably oppose" any merger by
one of the top 200 manufacturing firms of any leading producer in any
concentrated industry. Finally, the Department will continue to challenge
mergers which may substantially lessen potential competition or develop a
substantial potential for reciprocity.8 7
However, the Department has stated that it is not opposed to all con-
glomerate mergers. Readily admitting that in certain circumstances conglom-
erate mergers are pro-competitive, the Division has made it clear that it
would welcome a large firm's acquisition of a small factor in a concentrated
industry. Such a "foothold acquisition" would be beneficial to the market
structure since the revitalized merged company will be able to compete more
effectively against the industry leaders.88
The Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission, in its re-
cent Economic Report on Corporate Mergers (Report),8 9 agreed that Con-
gress enacted the Celler-Kefauver Act to prevent further increases in not
only market but also overall economic concentration. The Report pointed
out dangers to the country's socio-political system as well as to the economy
if economic power is concentrated in too few hands. The FTC Staff stated
that the Commission should direct its merger enforcement resources to focus
specifically on large conglomerate mergers, since it too was of the opinion
that acquisitions by large, diversified companies of leading firms in con-
centrated industries should be challenged, to ensure that entry by internal
growth or by the acquisition of small factors in the industry will be en-
couraged. The Staff argued for a broad definition of potential competitors
since history indicates that technological and other developments have
brought quite unrelated companies into competition at later times. And the
Staff further recommended that the enforcement agencies should evaluate
individual acquisitions within the broad context of the merger induced
structural changes which it feels are occurring within the economy. 90 These
recommendations were adopted, virtually in their entirety, by Chairman
Weinberger speaking for a unanimous commission. 91
Thus, both enforcement agencies have adopted a similar approach to
87 See supra note 8, at 55,509.
S8 Address by Assistant Att'y Gen. McLaren, Northwestern University Law School
Eighth Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago, Oct. 8, 1969, in 5 TRADE REG. REP.
50258, at 55,544 (Oct. 8, 1969); Address by Mr. McLaren, May 12, 1969, in 5 TRADE
REc. REP. 50,244, at 55,500 (June 9, 1969).
89 FTC REPORT at 9.
901d. at 12-18.
91 ANTiTRUST & TRADE KEG. REP. No. 450, at A-i (Feb. 24, 1970).
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conglomerate acquisitions. Both agree on the "leading firm" doctrine and
conversely that foothold acquisitions into concentrated industries should be
encouraged. The FTC, however, appears to adopt a stricter view as to those
mergers between large firms that should be challenged. The Commission has
stated that, based upon current knowledge of industrial structure, every
merger in which each of the parties has assets exceeding $250 million is
likely to be anticompetitive within the meaning of section 7.92 Thus, while
the Justice Department has suggested it will contest any merger between
the top 200 industrial corporations (or their equivalents), the FTC recom-
mends that any merger between firms of over $250 million should be chal-
lenged. Overall, conglomerates appear to be in for a difficult time from the
antitrust enforcement agencies.
92 FTC REPORT at 18.
